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ABSTRACT 
  In the years before Congress passed the America Invents Act, patent 
litigation became exorbitantly expensive. Congress created three types 
of proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), 
which were intended to provide a cheaper and more cost-effective 
alternative to district court litigation over patent validity. A major factor 
in ensuring that the PTAB proceedings effectively substituted for 
district court litigation was a harsh estoppel provision that prevented 
any petitioner from relitigating any issue which was raised or 
reasonably could have been raised during the PTAB proceeding. The 
Federal Circuit, however, recently applied a narrow interpretation to 
the estoppel provision which jeopardizes the ability of PTAB 
proceedings to replace district court litigation. 
  While it would be easy to place all the blame on the Federal Circuit 
for defanging the estoppel provision, this Note argues that the failure 
of PTAB proceedings to substitute for district court litigation ultimately 
stems from poor drafting within the America Invents Act. The 
combination of broad Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
substantive rulemaking power, unreviewable PTAB decisions to 
institute, and a sweeping estoppel provision doomed PTAB 
proceedings to failure. This Note offers that Congress must update the 
language of the statute itself in order to effectively address the issues 
presented by this combination. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Addressing a conference of intellectual property attorneys, Chief 
Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit called the PTAB a “death squad” 
for patents that “kill[s] property rights.”1 At the time he made this 
statement, the label—ominous as it was—had some measure of truth 
to it.2 Judge Rader was referring to the common critique that once the 
PTAB chooses to “institute,”3 or initiate, review on the validity of a 
patent,4 petitioners typically succeeded in invalidating at least one 
“claim,” or component, of that patent.5 By and large, however, labels 
of the PTAB being a “death squad” were unwarranted6 and the 
administrative proceedings before the PTAB were effectively serving 
their purpose7 as a cheaper alternative to district court litigation.8 That 
 
 1. Tony Dutra, Rader Regrets CLS Bank Impasse, Comments on Latest Patent Reform Bill, 
BNA (Oct. 29, 2013), https://www.bna.com/rader-regrets-cls-n17179879684 
[https://perma.cc/MUY6-9UCR]. 
 2. See Ryan Davis, PTAB’s ‘Death Squad’ Label Not Totally Off-Base, Chief Says, LAW360 
(Aug. 14, 2014, 5:47 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/567550/ptab-s-death-squad-label-not-
totally-off-base-chief-says [https://perma.cc/4AU5-ZLDQ] (“The Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board’s reputation as a ‘death squad’ for patents is ‘unfortunate language,’ but in some ways it 
adequately describes the mission Congress gave the board under the America Invents Act, its 
chief judge said at a meeting Thursday.”). 
 3. An administrative proceeding before the PTAB begins when the PTAB initiates review, 
referred to as “institut[ing]” review, on some or all of the grounds challenging the validity of a 
patent. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012). For an overview of the different forms of administrative 
proceedings held before the PTAB, see infra Part I.B. For an overview of institution on grounds 
raised in a petition, see infra Part II. 
 4. Petitioners raise “grounds” in a proceeding before the PTAB to challenge “claims” of 
the patent. A ground, as used in this Note, is a legal challenge to the validity of a patent. A claim, 
as used in this Note, refers to a patent claim. Patent claims define the scope of the patent and 
detail what the patent does. Each patent may have multiple claims within it. 
 5. See Amy Simpson & Hwa Lee, PTAB Kill Rates: How IPRs Are Affecting Patents, 
LAW360 (Sept. 15, 2015, 9:44 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/699860/ptab-kill-rates-how-
iprs-are-affecting-patents [https://perma.cc/9LRQ-H4HA] (noting that “88 percent of petitions 
with final written decisions resulted in at least one claim being invalidated”). 
 6. See id. (“Success starts and ends with the petition. The invalidity success rate for fully 
instituted petitions is 82 percent while the invalidity success rate for partially instituted petitions 
plummets to 52 percent. The PTAB’s first impression of the petition’s strength appears to affect 
the entire proceeding and ultimate outcome.”). 
 7. For a more in-depth discussion of the purpose of PTAB proceedings, see infra Part I.A. 
 8. See Jonathan Tamimi, Breaking Bad Patents: The Formula for Quick, Inexpensive 
Resolution of Patent Validity, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 587, 641 (2014) (“The data drawn from 
over one year of AIA reviews show that these procedures are effective and will continue to gain 
popularity among accused patent infringers.”). In 2012, the year in which PTAB proceedings were 
created, the median cost of patent litigation ran between $650,000 and $5 million depending on 
the size of the claim. Jim Kerstetter, How Much Is That Patent Lawsuit Going to Cost You?, 
CNET (Apr. 5, 2012, 10:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/how-much-is-that-patent-lawsuit-
going-to-cost-you [https://perma.cc/9D7Z-3LPZ]. 
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was so until recent developments in patent law that have rendered the 
label “death squad” uncannily accurate, albeit not for the reasons cited 
by Judge Rader.  
Before the PTAB existed, patent litigation was immensely 
expensive.9 Congress enacted the America Invents Act10 to provide 
some reprieve from these large and rising costs. The America Invents 
Act created the PTAB and proceedings before it, which are intended 
to serve as a faster and more cost-effective substitute for district court 
litigation.11 Instead of spending years and millions of dollars litigating 
the validity of a patent in a patent infringement suit, post–America 
Invents Act, would-be patent infringers can file a petition to challenge 
the validity of that patent before the PTAB.12 These proceedings not 
only enable the petitioner to save money, but also guarantee the 
petitioner will receive a decision within a year.13 Petitioners that choose 
this route, however, must also contend with an estoppel provision 
limiting what challenges they can raise in subsequent district court 
litigation. For example, if petitioners bring an inter partes review (IPR) 
proceeding14—the most common proceeding before the PTAB,15 
 
 9. See Kerstetter, supra note 8. 
 10. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
 11. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. 3426 (2011) (“Ideally, extending could-have-raised estoppel to 
privies will help ensure that if an inter partes review is instituted while litigation is pending, that 
review will completely substitute for at least the patents-and-printed-publications portion of the 
civil litigation.”). This is discussed in more detail at infra Part I.A. But see Cuozzo Speed Techs., 
LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016) (“Although Congress changed the name from 
‘reexamination’ to ‘review,’ nothing convinces us that, in doing so, Congress wanted to change its 
basic purposes, namely, to reexamine an earlier agency decision.”). 
 12. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012) (“Subject to the provisions of this chapter, a person who is 
not the owner of a patent may file with the Office a petition to institute an inter partes review of 
the patent.”). For an explanation of how the PTAB conducts its proceedings, see infra Part I.B. 
 13. See id. § 316(a)(11) (“The Director shall prescribe regulations–requiring that the final 
determination in an inter partes review be issued not later than 1 year after the date on which the 
Director notices the institution of a review . . . .”). The Director, in certain instances, may extend 
that time period, but not by not more than six months. Id. 
 14. An IPR is one of the administrative PTAB proceedings that can be used to challenge the 
validity of a patent outside the context of district court litigation. It is the most commonly utilized 
PTAB proceeding. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 
STATISTICS 2 (Dec. 31, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 PTAB Statistics], 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/aia_statistics_december2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9JLX-G9ZA] (highlighting that, as of December 31, 2016, IPR petitions 
constitute 91 percent of the total number of petitions filed since the proceedings began). An IPR 
is significantly cheaper and faster than district court litigation. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (noting 
that the PTAB must make its final determination within one year from the date of institution). 
 15. See 2016 PTAB Statistics, supra note 14 (noting that 91 percent of all petitions for PTAB 
review are IPR petitions). 
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allowing petitioners to challenge the validity of a patent for novelty and 
nonobviousness16—they cannot later challenge the validity of that 
patent on “any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could 
have raised during that inter partes review.”17 Petitioners who seek out 
the advantages of IPR proceedings are thus bound by those decisions, 
and cannot later relitigate novelty and nonobviousness at the district 
court level.18  
This estoppel provision may seem harsh on its face. As this Note 
will argue, this harshness is necessary to ensure that IPR proceedings 
before the PTAB are a complete substitute for district court litigation 
on novelty and nonobviousness grounds. On March 23, 2016, however, 
the Federal Circuit—the appellate court with jurisdiction over all 
patent appeals—undermined the ability of PTAB proceedings to 
substitute for district court litigation in Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v. 
Automated Creel Systems, Inc.19 In Shaw, Automated Creel sued Shaw 
Industries for infringing its patent regarding “creels,” which supply 
yarn.20 Automated Creel voluntarily dismissed that suit against Shaw 
Industries without prejudice,21 and shortly thereafter Shaw Industries 
submitted a petition to the PTAB for an IPR proceeding on all twenty-
one claims in Automated Creel’s patent.22 The PTAB instituted review 
on some, but not all, of the grounds that Shaw Industries raised in its 
petition.23 The PTAB ultimately upheld some of the patent claims as 
valid but ruled that others were invalid.24 
Shaw came before the Federal Circuit on appeal from the PTAB’s 
final written decision.25 The Federal Circuit purported to examine the 
PTAB’s practice of instituting review on only some rather than all or 
none of the grounds raised in an IPR petition—a practice also known 
as “partial institution.”26 The Federal Circuit nonetheless used this case 
as a vehicle to interpret the degree of estoppel attaching to IPRs, and 
 
 16. Petitioners may only challenge novelty and nonobviousness grounds in an IPR. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 311. For a more detailed description of IPR proceedings, see infra Part I.B. 
 17. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e). 
 18. See id. (noting that estoppel prohibits arguments raised previously before a court of law). 
 19. Shaw Indus. Grp. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 20. Id. at 1296. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 1296–97. 
 24. Id. at 1297. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 1298. 
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held in Shaw that estoppel only attaches to challenges raised “during” 
an IPR.27 Shaw Industries, in other words, could relitigate the 
noninstituted grounds in its petition because Shaw Industries could not 
have raised those challenges during the IPR.28 That is, if the petitioner 
makes an argument for invalidity on certain grounds but the PTAB 
never institutes review on those grounds, the Federal Circuit concluded 
that a petitioner could not reasonably have raised that ground during 
the IPR.29 
It would be easy to say that Shaw shoulders all the responsibility 
for upsetting the framework upon which PTAB proceedings rest. But 
if one looks more closely at the conundrum the Federal Circuit faced 
in Shaw, it becomes clear that Shaw is not solely to blame. The America 
Invents Act gave the PTO a large grant of substantive rulemaking 
power.30 The PTO quickly used that rulemaking power to draft a 
regulation enabling the PTAB to partially institute review on the 
grounds raised in a petition.31 Sometimes the PTAB uses partial 
institution to remove unmeritorious grounds from an IPR.32 At other 
times, the PTAB chooses not to institute on meritorious grounds for 
efficiency reasons;33 for example, if those grounds would be 
“redundant” with other grounds raised in the petition.34  
After Shaw, petitioners can relitigate the noninstituted grounds in 
their petitions. Petitioners are only estopped from litigating on the far 
narrower set of grounds upon which the PTAB chose to institute. As 
 
 27. See id. at 1300 (“The IPR does not begin until it is instituted. Thus, Shaw did not raise—
nor could it have reasonably raised—the Payne-based ground during the IPR.” (citation omitted) 
(citing In re Cuozzo Speed Techs, LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1272 (4th Cir. 2015))).  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143 (2016) (declining to read a 
procedural rulemaking limitation into the grant of rulemaking power to the PTO under the 
America Invents Act). 
 31. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2017) (enabling partial institution on grounds raised in a 
petition). 
 32. See id. § 42.108(c) (restricting review only to petitions for which the PTAB has 
determined “there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the claims challenged in the 
petition is unpatentable”). 
 33. See Shaw, 817 F.3d at 1298 (noting that “the Board’s statutory obligation to complete 
proceedings in a timely and efficient manner” provides some justification for partial institution). 
 34. See Bob High, Redundant Prior Art References and their Prejudicial Effects on Post-
Issuance Review Petitioners, 65 EMORY L.J. 581, 602 (2015) (“[T]he PTAB frequently employs 
the redundancy doctrine during CBMs and IPRs as a way to cut down the length of the 
proceeding.” (citing Oracle Corp. v. Clouding IP, LLC, No. IPR2013-00088, 2013 WL 5970180, at 
*1–2 (P.T.A.B. June 13, 2013))).  
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such, petitioners preserve grounds the PTAB considered redundant 
even if those grounds effectively argue the same point. This result robs 
the estoppel provision of its efficacy and as a result, in the wake of 
Shaw, the PTAB has become a “death squad” in fact as well as in 
reputation. Rather than serving as an alternative to the district courts 
on novelty and nonobviousness grounds, PTAB proceedings now serve 
only to invalidate patents and “kill[] property rights”35 because 
petitioners are not fully bound to the PTAB’s rulings in future 
litigation. In other words, instead of serving as a way to settle disputes 
between parties, PTAB proceedings now give petitioners a quick, 
cheap chance to invalidate a patent. If petitioners do not succeed on 
this attempt, they can still bring their claims before the district court. 
Shaw thus eliminates any risk petitioners face in bringing an IPR and 
allows petitioners to avail themselves of the cheapness and efficiency 
of PTAB decisions without submitting to the finality the Board’s 
rulings are meant to provide.  
On the other hand, the alternative—a broad interpretation of the 
estoppel provision—presents its own share of issues. It would be 
manifestly inequitable for petitioners who make every effort to litigate 
certain challenges before the PTAB to forever lose those challenges 
because the PTAB declined to institute upon them. Had Shaw come 
out the other way, using a broad interpretation of estoppel, IPR use 
also might decrease for the reason that petitioners would fear losing 
the chance to litigate even unheard challenges.36 The Federal Circuit 
faced an impossible situation when it reviewed Shaw, caught as it was 
between the pitfalls of either estoppel interpretation—and because 
either interpretation would have spelled danger for PTAB 
proceedings, the root of the problem lies beyond Shaw alone. 
This Note argues that the failure of PTAB proceedings to 
substitute for district court litigation ultimately stems from poor 
drafting within the America Invents Act. The combination of broad 
PTO substantive rulemaking power, unreviewable PTAB decisions to 
institute, and a sweeping estoppel provision doomed PTAB 
proceedings to failure. This Note argues that Congress must update the 
language of the statute itself in order to effectively address the issues 
presented by this combination. 
 
 35. Dutra, supra note 1. 
 36. Petitioners, however, had no way of knowing how the Federal Circuit would interpret 
the estoppel provision pre-Shaw yet nonetheless brought many IPR petitions. For further 
discussion, see infra note 223 and accompanying text. 
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This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a general 
overview of the various administrative proceedings before the PTAB. 
It first describes the overarching purpose for which Congress created 
PTAB proceedings, a cheap and fast substitute for district court 
litigation,37 which must shape all analyses of the statute. Part I next 
explains the structure of the three main administrative proceedings to 
challenge the validity of a patent before the PTAB—IPR, post grant 
review, and covered business method. This Note focuses primarily on 
the use of IPRs because IPRs are the most commonly utilized PTAB 
proceeding.38 
Part II delves into the way in which an IPR is instituted. First, it 
highlights that the PTAB’s decision to institute is final and 
unreviewable.39 Absent a flagrant violation of rights, a court may not 
review the PTAB’s decision to institute, or not to institute, an IPR.40 
Second, it describes the PTAB’s method for instituting an IPR. In 
particular, it details the PTAB’s practice of partially instituting 
review—a practice that was eventually codified in the Code of Federal 
Regulations by the PTO.41 The development of partial institution had 
enormous ramifications on the delicate system created by the America 
Invents Act and in many ways made inequity within the proceedings 
inevitable. There has been some debate on whether the PTO had the 
statutory authority to enable partial institution,42 but this Part argues 
that the PTO acted within its statutory grant of powers in enacting 
partial institution.  
Part III analyzes the effects of combined unreviewability and 
partial institution on the degree of estoppel attaching to IPRs. 
Specifically, this section emphasizes that the Federal Circuit in Shaw 
faced a situation in which an inequitable result was inevitable. If the 
estoppel provisions were taken to the full extent of the plain text, 
 
 37. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. 3426 (2011). 
 38. See 2016 PTAB Statistics, supra note 14 (listing statistics that show IPRs are the most 
commonly used PTAB proceeding). 
 39. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012). 
 40. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2136 (2016) (“We conclude that 
the first provision, though it may not bar consideration of a constitutional question, for example, 
does bar judicial review of the kind of mine-run claim at issue here . . . .”). 
 41. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (2017). 
 42. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The PTO improperly adopted a system 
of partial institution and partial final written decision, contravening the statute and the intent of 
Congress. The PTO has exceeded its statutory authority.”), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (2017). 
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challengers would be estopped from bringing grounds43 that they never 
actually had a chance to litigate,44 and the decision not to reach the 
merits on those grounds would be unreviewable.45 Yet, this Part 
contends that, equity notwithstanding, the Federal Circuit erred in its 
limited-scope interpretation of the estoppel. A limited-scope estoppel 
not only undermines the text, structure, and purpose of the statute, but 
it also will prove to be a poorly designed fix to inequity in the long run. 
It eliminates any risk petitioners face in bringing an IPR and gives 
petitioners a chance to invalidate a patent at minimal personal cost. 
Part IV proposes solutions to the problems identified above. This 
Part asserts that the Federal Circuit should reevaluate Shaw and 
interpret the estoppel provision as broadly as Congress intended. This 
interpretation may lead to inequity in the short term, but courts cannot 
undermine the plain meaning of the statute. Once the estoppel 
provision gets due weight, the legislature—and not the courts—must 
fix the remaining inconsistencies in the statutory framework.46 
Congress could fix the inconsistencies in two ways. It could require all-
or-none institution or, alternatively, it could require the PTAB to 
address every ground raised in a petition in its final written decision 
and permit review of the decision to institute. 
I.  BACKGROUND ON THE PATENT SYSTEM 
The life of a patent begins with an application to the PTO, the 
agency tasked with “grant[ing] patents for the protection of 
inventions.”47 The application must comply with PTO procedural 
requirements,48 and the claims within the patent must meet statutory 
requirements for patenting.49 Patent examiners at the PTO determine 
 
 43. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (extending estoppel to any claim the petitioner “raised or 
reasonably could have raised during that inter partes review”). 
 44. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (enabling the PTAB to partially institute on claims). 
 45. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (rendering the decision to institute unreviewable). 
 46. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case addressing the requirements of the 
written decision of an IPR. SAS Inst., Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 2160. As Part IV argues, however, any 
solution implemented by the Supreme Court may sow further chaos in the statutory framework.  
 47. General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents 
[https://perma.cc/2R3Q-J3QL]. 
 48. See id. (noting that nonprovisional applications must include a specification describing 
the invention and listing the claims, drawings if necessary, an oath, and a filing fee). 
 49. These statutory requirements include whether the subject matter is patentable, 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101, and the claim is novel, id. § 102, nonobvious, id. § 103, definite, id. § 112, enabled, id., and 
described, id.  
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whether the claims in the application meet the statutory requirements, 
but do so under limited resources and rarely with enough time to fully 
examine every aspect regarding the validity of a patent. In 2015, for 
instance, the PTO received 629,647 patent applications and granted 
325,979.50 It is inevitable, due to the sheer volume of applications, that 
some of the patents granted will be invalid on at least one of the 
statutory grounds. And because patents interfere with innovation 
within the scope of their claims,51 the existence of potentially invalid 
patents takes on new significance. Litigating at the district court level 
is expensive and time consuming. Given these constraints, the 
availability of some form of post grant review becomes crucial to the 
proper functioning of the patent system. The America Invents Act, 
which created the PTAB and its proceedings, was intended to address 
this need. 
A. The Purpose of PTAB Proceedings 
Congress enacted the America Invents Act to provide a cheaper 
and more efficient forum than the district courts to litigate the validity 
of a patent.52 The statute was enacted against a backdrop of large and 
rising costs for patent litigants created by a system of extensive and 
complex patenting.53 In 2004 for example, Michael Kirk, then the 
executive director of the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association, estimated that “the average cost of patent litigation, 
including the costs of discovery, ranges between $500,000 and 
$3,995,000 per party.”54 By 2012, when the America Invents Act came 
into effect, these numbers had climbed even higher. For claims worth 
 
 50. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963 - 2015, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
(June 15, 2016), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm 
[https://perma.cc/VKW3-VRKJ]. 
 51. The scope of the patent claim refers to the breadth of the claim, i.e., the extent to which 
it covers all inventions within its niche of one of the technological fields. 
 52. See, e.g., SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC., 825 F.3d 1341, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the proceedings before 
the PTAB “substitut[e] . . . for district court proceedings on aspects of patent validity”), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (2017). 
 53. Inventors, for instance, can patent improvements on existing patents, creating a system 
of “blocking” patents—the second inventor cannot use the improvement without a license for the 
underlying patent, and the original inventor cannot use the improvement without a license from 
the second inventor. 
 54. Patent Quality Improvement: Post-Grant Opposition: Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 29 (2004) 
(statement of Michael Kirk, Executive Director, American Intellectual Property Law 
Association). 
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less than $1 million, the median cost of litigation was $650,000.55 For 
claims between $1 million and $25 million, the median cost of litigation 
was $2.5 million.56 For claims worth more than $25 million, the median 
cost of litigation was $5 million.57 Faced with the threat of such 
“prohibitively expensive” sums, alleged patent infringers tended to 
settle even on unmeritorious claims.58 Further compounding this issue, 
the validity of many of the patents asserted was dubious at best.59 
Proceedings before the PTAB solve the problem of rising costs.60 
They provide a “just, speedy, and inexpensive” alternative to district 
court litigation.61 After the America Invents Act, instead of litigating 
the validity of a patent at the district court level, an alleged infringer 
can instead file a petition for review before the PTAB,62 an “expert 
tribunal” that “facilitate[s] both the validation of properly issued 
 
 55. Kerstetter, supra note 8. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 
FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 600 (2012). Some entities, called patent assertion entities, acquire patents from 
other parties merely to assert those patents against alleged infringers and thereby force a large 
settlement payout. FTC, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC STUDY 1 (2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftc-
study/p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/2J9X-
FZBF]. 
 59. Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law 
Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1599–1600 (2009) (“They cloak themselves in the 
legitimacy of patents, exploiting the widespread perception that where there is a patent there 
must be innovation. Sadly, this is not always true. And this stark fact explains succinctly why the 
market for true troll activity is not worth defending.”). 
 60. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(Newman, J, concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that the proceedings before the PTAB 
“substitut[e] . . . for district court proceedings on aspects of patent validity”), cert. granted, 137 S. 
Ct. 2160 (2017). 
 61. 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b) (2017) (establishing that the regulations the PTO adopts to govern 
PTAB proceedings “shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of 
every proceeding”). 
 62. If the petitioner has already been sued for alleged infringement at the district court level, 
the petitioner can request a stay of litigation at the district court during the PTAB proceeding. 
The America Invents Act sets forth the test the district court should apply in judging whether to 
stay litigation pending covered business method review. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 
18(b)(1), 35 U.S.C. § 321 note (2012). The statute is, however, silent with respect to post grant 
reviews and IPRs. A district court is not required to grant a stay pending the outcome of a post 
grant review or an IPR, but may choose to do so at its discretion. See, e.g., Invensys Sys., Inc. v. 
Emerson Elec. Co., No. 6:12-CV-00799, 2014 WL 4477393, at *1 (E.D. Tex. July 25, 2014) 
(denying a stay of litigation); Black Hills Media, LLC v. Pioneer Elecs. (USA) Inc., No. CV 14-
00471 (SJO) (PJWx), 2014 WL 4638170, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2014) (granting a stay of 
litigation). 
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patents and the elimination of invalid patents.”63 If the PTAB institutes 
review on any of the grounds raised in a petition, the petitioner is 
guaranteed a decision on that ground within a year,64 subject at most to 
a six-month extension for good cause.65 This system potentially saves 
petitioners years of litigation and the consequent costs. If the PTAB 
invalidates any patent claims, those claims are no longer part of the 
patent, and patent holders cannot file a claim for infringement on those 
grounds. If the PTAB upholds any of the patent claims, on the other 
hand, the petitioner cannot later challenge the patent on the same 
grounds at the district court level if a patent holder sues the petitioner 
for infringement.66 This limitation significantly reduces the number of 
contested issues within the district court litigation.67  
The estoppel provision is, in many ways, the glue that holds this 
system together. Estopping the same petitioner from relitigating 
nonobviousness and novelty grounds protects the system from abuse. 
It prevents parties from challenging the same patent multiple times on 
grounds that they raised or could reasonably have raised during the 
first proceeding.68 It thus ensures that the proceedings constitute a true 
substitute for the district court within their scope.69 
B. The Main Forms of Review Before the PTAB 
The America Invents Act creates, among other specialized forms 
of review,70 three main administrative proceedings in which petitioners 
may challenge the validity of a patent before the PTAB, including post 
 
 63. SAS Inst. Inc., 825 F.3d at 1353 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 64. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (2012). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. § 315(e)(2). 
 67. See id. (noting that petitioners cannot relitigate the same grounds at the district court 
level, reducing the number of issues before the district court). 
 68. See 157 CONG. REC. 2710 (2011) (noting that the bill “would include a strengthened 
estoppel standard to prevent petitioners from raising in a subsequent challenge the same patent 
issues that were raised or reasonably could have been raised in a prior challenge. The bill would 
significantly reduce the ability to use post grant procedures for abusive serial challenges to 
patents.”). 
 69. But see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143 (2016) (“The problem 
with Cuozzo’s argument, however, is that, in other significant respects, inter partes review is less 
like a judicial proceeding and more like a specialized agency proceeding.”). 
 70. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 257 (2012) (governing supplemental examination review, which 
protects against a claim of inequitable conduct). 
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grant review,71 covered business method review,72 and IPR.73 A 
challenger may, within the first nine months of a patent’s life,74 bring a 
post grant review proceeding on any ground of invalidity.75 After nine 
months76—unless the patent is a covered business method patent77—a 
challenger may only bring an IPR on novelty and nonobviousness 
grounds.78  
All three proceedings feature a number of advantages over district 
court litigation, making them more attractive to those challenging the 
validity of a patent. As mentioned above, these proceedings are subject 
to strict time constraints to ensure they fulfill their promise of 
providing a faster alternative to district court litigation.79 Not only are 
the proceedings before the PTAB efficient and therefore less costly 
than district court litigation,80 they are also subject to a preponderance 
of the evidence standard of review.81 Finally, there is a good chance of 
success if the PTAB institutes review on a petition because the 
standard for institution requires that the PTAB find “a reasonable 
likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 
[one] of the claims challenged in the petition.”82  
Despite these common benefits, each proceeding nonetheless 
serves a unique function within the system and incorporates a different 
type of estoppel against subsequent PTAB and district court 
proceedings. This Note primarily analyzes IPRs, but this Section 
 
 71. Id. § 321. 
 72. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284, 529–31 (2011).  
 73. 35 U.S.C. § 311.  
 74. Id. § 321(c). 
 75. Id. § 321(b). 
 76. Id. § 311(c). 
 77. For more information on covered business method patents, see infra Part I.B.2. 
 78. Id. § 311(b). 
 79. For more information on the time limitations of PTAB proceedings, see supra notes 64–
65 and accompanying text. 
 80. Instead of litigating the validity of a patent for years before a district court, spending 
countless dollars on legal fees and risking the potential of accruing additional damages, see supra 
notes 52–59, petitioners litigating before the PTAB receive a decision within a year and accrue 
fewer legal fees in the process, see infra note 81. 
 81. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e); id. § 326(e); see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, § 18(a)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 329 (2011) (aligning the standards and procedures of covered 
business method review with those of post grant review). 
 82. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); see also id. § 324(a) (requiring that a petition for post grant review 
“demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least [one] of the claims challenged in the 
petition is unpatentable”); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1) (aligning the standards 
and procedures of covered business method review with those of post grant review). 
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provides a brief overview of all three forms of review in order to 
contextualize the proceedings before the PTAB. The issues later 
presented with respect to IPRs also apply in full to post grant review 
proceedings because post grant review proceedings are subject to the 
same estoppel standard.83 Covered business method review, because it 
utilizes a different standard of estoppel,84 sheds light on the analysis 
only to the extent that it further reinforces how the estoppel provision 
of IPRs should apply. 
1. Post Grant Review.  Post grant review is the most complete 
substitute for district court litigation of the proceedings before the 
PTAB. Yet, due to its short filing deadlines, it is also the least 
commonly used form of review.85 Any patent may be challenged in a 
post grant review proceeding, and petitioners may raise any ground of 
invalidity during the course of that proceeding.86 If the PTAB institutes 
on some or all of the grounds raised in a post grant review petition, 
petitioners cannot later challenge the same patent claim “on any 
ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised 
during that post grant review.”87 Post grant review, however, is only 
available for petitioners during the first nine months following the 
issuance of a patent.88 Given the high rate at which patents are 
granted,89 few petitioners are able to identify invalid patents quickly 
enough to meet the deadline for post grant review.90 The time 
constraint therefore limits its potential as a substitute for district courts. 
2. Covered Business Method Review.  Covered business method 
review is a transitional form of PTAB review created by the America 
Invents Act. It became available on September 16, 2012, and will sunset 
 
 83. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (establishing a raised or reasonably could have raised 
standard for estoppel), with id. § 325(e) (same). 
 84. For an explanation of the estoppel attaching to covered business method reviews, see 
infra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
 85. See 2016 PTAB Statistics, supra note 14 (noting that petitions for post grant review 
constitute only 1 percent of the total petitions made to the PTAB). 
 86. 35 U.S.C. § 321(b). Those grounds include, for instance, patent eligible subject matter, 
id. § 101, utility, id. § 101, novelty, id. § 102, nonobviousness, id. § 103, definiteness, id. §112, 
written description, id. § 112, and enablement, id. § 112. 
 87. Id. § 325(e)(1). 
 88. Id. § 321(c). 
 89. For more information on the rate at which patents are granted, see supra note 50 and 
accompanying text. 
 90. Between September 16, 2012 and December 31, 2016, only forty-four post grant review 
petitions were filed with the PTAB. 2016 PTAB Statistics, supra note 14, at 2. 
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on September 16, 2020.91 Petitioners may only bring a covered business 
method review on a “covered business method patent[],” a label which 
encompasses a small subset of patents.92 Covered business method 
review proceedings are subject to the same standards and procedures 
as post grant review proceedings, with a few exceptions.93 As is the case 
with post grant review, for example, petitioners may challenge a 
covered business method patent on any ground of invalidity.94 There is, 
however, no nine-month time constraint to file a covered business 
method challenge.95 Covered business method review is also subject to 
a different estoppel provision than post grant review.96 If the PTAB 
institutes on a petition, the petitioner cannot later raise any challenge 
actually brought before the PTAB during that covered business 
method review, but is free to raise challenges that reasonably could 
have been brought before the PTAB—unlike post grant review.97  
3. Inter Partes Review.  IPRs constitute almost all of the petitions 
filed before the PTAB despite the fact that the scope of an IPR is much 
more limited than post grant review or covered business method 
review.98 Petitioners may only bring IPRs after nine months have 
passed from the issuance of a patent,99 so IPRs replace post grant 
review proceedings once the time limit has expired on the latter. These 
 
 91. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(3)(A), 35 U.S.C. § 321 note (2012) (“This 
subsection, and the regulations issued under this subsection, are repealed effective upon the 
expiration of the 8–year period beginning on the date that the regulations issued under to 
paragraph (1) take effect.”); Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, U.S. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-
process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/transitional-program-covered-business 
[https://perma.cc/FKL8-CNEU]. 
 92. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1), 325 U.S.C. § 321 note (2012). A covered 
business method patent is a patent “claim[ing] a method or corresponding apparatus for 
performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or 
management of a financial product or service, except that the term does not include patents for 
technological inventions.” Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(d)(1). 
 93. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)(A). 
 94. 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (2012). 
 95. See id. § 321(c) (imposing a nine-month time constraint on filing petitions for post grant 
review); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)(A) (exempting covered business method 
review from § 321(c)’s requirements). 
 96. See 25 U.S.C. § 325(e)(2) (2012) (imposing estoppel rules for post grant review); Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)(A) (exempting covered business method review from § 
325(e)(2)’s requirements). 
 97. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)(D). 
 98. See 2016 PTAB Statistics, supra note 14, at 2 (showing that IPR petitions comprise 91 
percent of the total petitions filed before the PTAB). 
 99. 35 U.S.C. § 311(c). 
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filing time differences ensure that petitioners cannot pick and choose 
between the two forms of review; the choice is made for the petitioner 
depending on when he chooses to file. During the course of an IPR, 
petitioners may only challenge a patent claim on the grounds of novelty 
and nonobviousness.100 If the PTAB institutes review on a petition, the 
petitioner cannot later litigate any challenge he “raised or reasonably 
could have raised during that inter partes review.”101 This estoppel 
provision, even taken at its broadest, therefore permits a petitioner to 
later challenge the validity of a patent on grounds other than novelty 
and nonobviousness. As noted above, because IPRs are utilized much 
more extensively than the other forms of review available before the 
PTAB, the remainder of this Note will focus on IPRs. 
II.  THE VALIDITY OF PARTIAL INSTITUTION UNDER THE AMERICA 
INVENTS ACT 
An IPR begins when the PTAB “institute[s]”102 review on all or 
some of the grounds raised in a petition.103 The decision to institute—
or not to institute—an IPR is “final and nonappealable”;104 in other 
words, the courts may not review the merits of the decision.105 
A. The History Behind the Adoption of Partial Institution 
The America Invents Act does not detail the manner in which the 
PTAB institutes an IPR review. It provides for the PTAB to institute 
review on grounds raised in a petition for an IPR,106 but it fails to 
specify whether that review must be on all of the grounds raised or only 
some of the grounds. In the absence of a clear statutory guideline, the 
PTO exercised its rulemaking authority under the America Invents 
 
 100. Id. § 311(b) (allowing in IPRs only those grounds that could be raised under sections 102 
or 103); see also id. § 102 (establishing novelty as a condition for patentability); § 103 
(nonobviousness). Other grounds, such as § 101 patent eligible subject matter or § 112 
definiteness, are not available to the petitioner in an IPR. 
 101. Id. § 315(e). 
 102. Id. § 314(a). 
 103. The PTAB may, of course, choose not to institute review on any of the grounds raised in 
a petition—in that case, no IPR has occurred, and the petitioner is free to raise those grounds in 
subsequent litigation. 
 104. Id. § 314(d). 
 105. But see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016) (explaining that 
the court may review institution decisions in cases involving “shenanigans” such as a violation of 
a petitioner’s constitutional rights). 
 106. 35 U.S.C. § 314. 
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Act107 and enacted a regulation in 2012 permitting the PTAB to 
partially institute—that is, to institute review on only some of the 
grounds raised in an IPR petition.108 
The PTO’s interest in allowing the PTAB to partially institute 
made a great deal of sense when the regulation was codified. The first 
time the PTAB utilized partial institution, for example, a petitioner 
had raised 422 challenges to the validity of twenty claims within a 
patent.109 For each patent claim, in other words, the petitioner 
challenged it on roughly twenty-one grounds.110 It would have been 
nearly impossible for the PTAB to review all of these challenges and 
still meet its statutory deadline for rendering a final decision.111 Citing 
efficiency reasons, the PTAB identified redundant grounds within the 
petition.112 It then ordered the petitioner to choose only one ground 
from each set of redundant grounds to use in the proceeding.113 
The case described above, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. 
Progressive Casualty Insurance Company,114 involved a covered 
business method review, but the logic behind it was quickly extended 
to IPRs.115 In the PTAB’s first IPR decision, Garmin International, Inc. 
v. Cuozzo Speed Technologies LLC,116 the petitioners raised many 
varying novelty and nonobviousness challenges against twenty patent 
claims.117 The PTAB, however, instituted review only on two of those 
grounds—and only on those two grounds as applied to three of the 
twenty patent claims challenged.118 The PTAB ruled that the petitioner 
 
 107. See id. § 316(a)(2) (enabling the PTO to “set[] forth the standards for the showing of 
sufficient grounds to institute a review); id. § 316(a)(4) (allowing the PTO to draft regulations 
“establishing and governing inter partes review”). 
 108. See Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review 
Proceedings, and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 
48,680, 48,728 (Aug. 14, 2012) (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 42.108). 
 109. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM-2012-00003 (JL), 2012 WL 
9494791, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2012). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (requiring the PTAB to render a final decision within one 
year, with an available six-month extension for good cause). 
 112. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 WL 9494791, at *1. 
 113. Id. at *4, *6, *7, *8, *9. 
 114. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM-2012-00003 (JL), 2012 WL 
9494791 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2012). 
 115. Id. at *1. 
 116. Garmin Int’l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, No. IPR2012-00001 (JL), 2013 WL 
5947691 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 9, 2013). 
 117. Id. at *1–2. 
 118. Id. at *14–15. 
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had not shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on any of the other 
grounds raised in the petition and declined to institute review upon 
them.119 In this way, partial institution became an accepted practice 
during proceedings before the PTAB. 
B. Criticism Regarding the Adoption and Implications of Partial 
Institution 
From the outset, the practice of partial institution by the PTAB 
has been criticized by some in the patent community. Critics argue that 
the deference standard for agency interpretations laid out in Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.120 should not 
apply to the PTO’s adoption of partial institution.121 Under Chevron, 
courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision if the 
statute is ambiguous, and given that ambiguity, the agency’s 
interpretation is a reasonable reading of the statute.122 The Federal 
Circuit in Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corporation123 recently 
upheld the validity of partial institution as a “reasonable interpretation 
of the statutory provision governing the institution of inter partes 
review” under Chevron.124 Critics nonetheless argue that partial 
institution is not entitled to Chevron deference because the PTO 
exceeded the bounds of its statutory authority in codifying partial 
institution.125 
 
 119. Id. at *14. 
 120. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under Chevron, 
a court grants deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision if: 1) Congress has 
not directly spoken on the issue, or the statute is ambiguous, and 2) provided the statute is 
ambiguous, the agency’s interpretation is a permissible reading of the statute; in other words, if it 
is reasonable. Id. at 842–43. 
 121. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The PTO departed from the statute in 
adopting regulations that authorize review of only some of the challenged claims and grounds, as 
in 37 C.F.R. 42.108(a).”), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (2017); Timothy K. Wilson & John S. 
Sieman, Guest Post: PTAB Partial Institution of IPR and CBM Review Violates the AIA– But 
There Is a Simple Fix, PATENTLY-O (May 29, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/05/partial-
institution-violates.html [https://perma.cc/VN3Q-QYPF] (“While the PTAB’s practice of partial 
institution may help complete trials within the required one-year period, the practice violates the 
statute and strips petitioners of a statutory appeal right as to excluded claims.”). 
 122. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842–43.  
 123. Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2016), overruled on 
other grounds, Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  
 124. Id. at 1316. 
 125. See SAS Inst., Inc., 825 F.3d at 1356 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“The PTO departed from the statute in adopting regulations that authorize review of only 
some of the challenged claims and grounds, as in 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a).”); Wilson & Sieman, supra 
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First, critics claim that partial institution unambiguously violates 
the text of the statute itself.126 The statute requires the PTAB to issue 
a final decision “with respect to the patentability of any patent claim 
challenged by the petitioner.”127 This decision, the argument goes, must 
include all grounds the petitioner challenges, not just the instituted 
grounds.128 To exclude certain grounds from the final decision “strips 
petitioners of a statutory appeal right as to excluded [grounds],” 
violating the clear language of the statute.129 
Second, critics argue that partial institution undermines the 
purpose of replacing district court litigation.130 As Judge Newman 
summarized, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Synopsys, Inc., 
under the statutory framework, the PTAB may not institute review on 
only some of the grounds raised in a petition for review.131 Contrary to 
the majority’s assertion that it was required to defer to the agency’s 
interpretation under Chevron, Judge Newman wrote, “[T]he intent of 
Congress is plain in the statute. There is no ambiguity, and no silence; 
Chevron provides no support for ‘pick and choose’ authority.”132 In 
other words, Congress plainly intended for PTAB proceedings to serve 
as a cheap and fast substitute for district court litigation.133 Extending 
this logic, the implementation of partial institution undermines this 
goal because petitioners are no longer assured that all of their grounds 
challenging a patent claim—at least with respect to novelty or 
nonobviousness—will be litigated with finality in this alternative 
forum. Rather than saving the petitioner time and money, therefore, 
the proceedings merely “impose[] additional delay, uncertainty, and 
cost” on petitioners.134 If petitioners cannot rely on PTAB proceedings 
 
note 121 (“While the PTAB’s practice of partial institution may help complete trials within the 
required one-year period, the practice violates the statute and strips petitioners of a statutory 
appeal right as to excluded claims.”). 
 126. See Wilson & Sieman, supra note 121 (arguing that partial institution violates the text of 
the statute). 
 127. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (2012). 
 128. Wilson & Sieman, supra note 121. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Senator Grassley further summarized, 
at enactment, that the purpose of the estoppel is to ‘completely substitute’ for the same issues in 
litigation.”), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (2017). 
 134. Id. 
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to resolve all of their novelty or nonobviousness grounds, the 
proceedings cannot be a complete substitute for the district courts on 
those challenges.135 
Critics additionally emphasize that, prior to the America Invents 
Act, the Federal Circuit had never recognized substantive rulemaking 
power for the PTO.136 Under previous statutory schemes, the PTO 
could only draft rules and regulations about procedural, as opposed to 
substantive, matters.137 The implementation of partial institution is 
arguably procedural rulemaking, and could thus comply even on a 
conservative reading of the PTO’s rulemaking power. On the other 
hand, partial institution affects the rights and duties of the parties 
involved, which has traditionally been seen as a substantive function.138 
Even if the PTO did engage in substantive rulemaking in its adoption 
of partial institution, given the Supreme Court’s decision in Cuozzo 
Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee,139 the PTO likely did not overstep its 
authority. In Cuozzo, the Court explicitly declined to read a procedural 
limitation into the PTO’s rulemaking power under the America 
Invents Act;140 in other words, the easier substance-versus-procedure 
argument is no longer available, and critics are left with other more 
difficult arguments about agency authority.  
 
 135. Id. (“The ‘complete substitution’ for section 102 and 103 issues cannot occur unless all of 
the claims challenged in the petition are included when post-grant review is accepted.”). 
 136. See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., 
dissenting) (“The word ‘conduct’ connotes procedure. Section 316 identifies areas whose conduct 
is assigned to the PTO, including public access to proceedings, discovery rules, and the right to a 
hearing. I discern no authorization to the PTO to change the law of how claims of issued patents 
are construed.”); see also Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(“As we have previously held, the broadest of the PTO’s rulemaking powers—35 U.S.C. § 6(a)—
authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate regulations directed only to ‘the conduct of 
proceedings in the [PTO]’; it does NOT grant the Commissioner the authority to issue substantive 
rules.”). 
 137. Merck, 80 F.3d at 1549–50. 
 138. The Federal Circuit has only addressed the divide between substantive and procedural 
rulemaking once, but its decision in that case was subsequently vacated for a rehearing en banc 
that never occurred. Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 328 F. App’x 658 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). In the vacated decision, the Federal Circuit indicated that it would follow District of 
Columbia Circuit precedent on the issue. Id. at 1356. Specifically, the Federal Circuit highlighted 
“that a critical feature of the procedural exception [in section 553 of the APA] is that it covers 
agency actions that do not themselves alter the rights or interests of parties, although [they] may 
alter the manner in which the parties present themselves or their viewpoints to the agency.” Id. 
(quoting JEM Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 22 F.3d 320, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1994)) (emphasis omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 139. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).  
 140. See id. at 2143 (declining to read a procedural rulemaking limitation into the grant of 
rulemaking power to the PTO under the America Invents Act). 
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C. Why Partial Institution is Permissible under the America Invents 
Act 
In Cuozzo, the Supreme Court addressed two main issues. First, 
the Court addressed the reviewability of a decision to institute an IPR; 
second, it addressed the PTO’s authority to issue a regulation 
implementing the “broadest reasonable interpretation”141 standard of 
review for claim construction. The Supreme Court held that, absent 
“shenanigans” such as a violation of a petitioner’s constitutional rights, 
the decision to institute an IPR was unreviewable.142 It also held that 
the broadest reasonable interpretation standard was entitled to 
Chevron deference.143 Even though this standard differs from the one 
district courts use,144 the Court highlighted that the America Invents 
Act does not specify the standard of review that applies to claim 
interpretations.145 The Court, finding no clear textual mandate, 
deferred to the agency’s interpretation of the standard required.146 In 
upholding the PTO’s broadest reasonable interpretation standard, the 
Court further noted that the America Invents Act gives the PTO a 
broad grant of rulemaking authority to govern the conduct of IPRs, 
and that grant was not limited to purely procedural rulemaking.147 The 
Court’s recognition of broad rulemaking power renders the line 
between procedural and substantive rulemaking irrelevant in the 
context of the America Invents Act. If the PTO can issue substantive 
rules, it does not matter whether the rule enabling partial institution 
was procedural or substantive in nature. The classification has no 
impact on its validity.  
Beyond classifying the nature of the PTO’s rulemaking, Cuozzo 
silences much of the basis for critiquing the adoption of partial 
institution. The Supreme Court’s justification for applying Chevron 
 
 141. Broadest reasonable interpretation is also the standard that PTO examiners use in their 
initial review of a patent application. Broadest reasonable interpretation requires that “an 
examiner . . . construe claim terms in the broadest reasonable manner during prosecution as is 
reasonably allowed in an effort to establish a clear record of what applicant intends to claim.” 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2111 
(9th ed. 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2111.html [https://perma.cc/EQP2-
H2W8]. This standard differs from the standard which the courts apply in interpreting claims. Id.  
 142. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 136 S. Ct. at 2141–42. 
 143. Id. at 2141–46. 
 144. Id. at 2136. 
 145. See id. at 2141–46 (applying Chevron analysis to the rule implementing broadest 
reasonable interpretation and concluding that the rule is entitled to deference). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
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deference in Cuozzo naturally extends to cover partial institution. The 
Supreme Court first noted that the statute is silent regarding the 
standard the PTAB should use in interpreting claims, creating a gap 
and ambiguity.148 The Court next reasoned that, although different 
standards at the PTAB and district court level “may produce 
inconsistent results and cause added confusion,” this possibility alone 
is not enough to render the interpretation unreasonable.149 Because the 
interpretation was reasonable, the PTAB could use the broadest 
reasonable interpretation standard to interpret the scope of patent 
claims. 
As with the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, the 
America Invents Act is silent as to when the PTAB should institute 
review on the grounds raised in a petition. It also does not specify 
whether the PTAB must institute on all of the grounds raised in a 
petition or if it may institute on only some of them. The same statutory 
provision which granted the PTO authority to regulate the standard for 
claim interpretation also governs the PTAB’s institution conduct; that 
is, “The Director shall prescribe regulations . . . establishing and 
governing inter partes review.”150 It is hard to see how regulations 
relating to the number of grounds addressed in the course of an IPR 
would be any less a part of “establishing and governing” an IPR than 
the standard of claim interpretation utilized within that review. Even 
were this grant of rulemaking power lacking, however, the PTO also 
has the authority to “set[] forth the standards for the showing of 
sufficient grounds to institute a review.”151 Although the Supreme 
Court has not definitively affirmed this authority, the combination of 
these two provisions in the wake of Cuozzo provides sufficient 
foundation to support the PTO’s authority to enable partial 
institutions. 
A challenger to this line of reasoning might argue against granting 
Chevron deference for partial institution on the notion that partial 
institutioncontravenes the purpose of PTAB proceedings—providing 
 
 148. See id. at 2142 (“No statutory provision unambiguously directs the agency to use one 
standard or the other. And the statute ‘express[ly] . . . authoriz[es] [the Patent Office] to engage 
in the process of rulemaking’ to address that gap.”). 
 149. See id. at 2146 (“This possibility, however, has long been present in our patent system, 
[providing] different tracks—in the Patent Office and in the courts—for the review and 
adjudication of patent claims. . . . These different evidentiary burdens mean that the possibility of 
inconsistent results is inherent to Congress’ regulatory design.”). 
 150. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(4) (2012). 
 151. Id. § 316(a)(2). 
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a cheap and fast substitute for district court litigation152—because it 
allows for an incomplete substitute for district court litigation.153 If 
petitioners do not receive a decision on the merits for all the grounds 
they raise before the PTAB, then by definition the partial institution 
proceedings do not substitute for district court litigation on 
nonobviousness and novelty grounds. But even before Cuozzo, this 
line of reasoning would have been weak. In the America Invents Act, 
Congress itself specifically instructs the director to “consider the effect 
of any such regulation on the economy, the integrity of the patent 
system, the efficient administration of the Office, and the ability of the 
Office to timely complete proceedings instituted under this chapter” 
when drafting regulations governing PTAB proceedings.154 With 
respect to the first two considerations, the director could reasonably 
find the effect of partial institution to be detrimental. It could hurt the 
economy because it undercuts the cost savings promised by PTAB 
proceedings, and it could hurt the integrity of the patent system 
because it leads to duplicative processes with the district courts and 
gaming of the system. Yet, these arguments are flimsy in comparison 
to how directly the regulations meet the second two considerations 
identified by Congress. Partial institution improves efficiency and 
enables the PTAB to comply with its statutory deadline in the face of 
voluminous challenges. Given how directly partial institution addresses 
these considerations, and given that the statute itself does not specify 
how to weigh each factor, the courts would likely defer to the PTO’s 
balancing of the four considerations and corresponding determination 
that partial institution satisfies the statute. 
As a result, post-Cuozzo, the purposive argument against Chevron 
deference is all but foreclosed. In Cuozzo, Cuozzo explicitly argued 
that PTAB proceedings were designed to substitute for district court 
litigation.155 The Court, however, rejected this notion in its Chevron 
analysis despite clear indications in the America Invents Act and the 
legislative history regarding this substitution purpose.156 In reaching its 
conclusion, the Court gave short shrift to the argument that allowing 
 
 152. For more explanation on the purpose of PTAB proceedings, see supra Part I.A. 
 153. For more information regarding the argument that partial institution contravenes the 
purpose of the America Invents Act, see supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text.  
 154. 35 U.S.C. § 316(b) (emphasis added). 
 155. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143 (2016). 
 156. See id. (“The problem with Cuozzo’s argument, however, is that, in other significant 
respects, inter partes review is less like a judicial proceeding and more like a specialized agency 
proceeding.”). 
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the PTAB to utilize a different standard than the district courts would 
undermine the ability of the PTAB to replace district court litigation 
on a subset of issues.157 Instead, the Supreme Court observed that the 
purpose of IPRs is merely to “reexamine an earlier agency decision,” 
not to substitute for district court litigation.158 Thus, challengers 
opposing the application of Chevron deference by relying on the 
purpose of PTAB proceedings are likely out of luck, given how directly 
the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Cuozzo.159 Looking 
beyond this one case, it also signals that challengers cannot rely on the 
courts to uphold the careful system established by Congress. Because 
the Supreme Court has spoken, Congress—and not the courts—must 
be the actor to fix the system. 
III.  THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTION ON ESTOPPEL 
Although the PTO likely had sufficient statutory authorization to 
establish partial institution, partial institution nevertheless undermines 
the estoppel system Congress created. Petitioners in an IPR cannot 
later raise before a district court any ground they raised or reasonably 
could have raised during the IPR.160 If the estoppel were interpreted as 
broadly as the language of the statute suggests, petitioners could not 
subsequently raise grounds on which the PTAB did not institute.161 In 
other words, they could not later raise grounds that they never actually 
had the opportunity to litigate before the PTAB.162 If, however, the 
estoppel provision were interpreted in a more limited manner to apply 
only to instituted grounds, the provision effectively becomes 
meaningless. Nothing would prevent petitioners from subsequently 
litigating noninstituted grounds, even if those noninstituted grounds 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 2144 (“The name and accompanying procedures suggest that the proceeding offers 
a second look at an earlier administrative grant of a patent. Although Congress changed . . . 
‘reexamination’ to ‘review,’ nothing convinces us that, in doing so, Congress wanted to change its 
basic purposes, namely, to reexamine an earlier agency decision.”).  
 159. See id. at 2142–43 (rejecting the argument that IPRs were intended to substitute for 
district court litigation). 
 160. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2018). 
 161. See High, supra note 34, at 610 (“The likely result is that this provision estops the 
petitioner from asserting grounds of unpatentability which neither the PTO nor a district court 
has ever considered, leading to potentially unfair outcomes for the petitioner.”). 
 162. For an explanation of why petitioners reasonably would not have had the chance to 
litigate their claims if the PTAB did not institute review on them, see infra Part III.A. 
GENTILLI IN FC (CLEAN) (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2018  11:39 PM 
1602  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1579 
are redundant with the instituted grounds.163 In this way, a limited-
scope interpretation renders the “or reasonably could have been 
raised” language a dead letter.164 
As a result, the Federal Circuit faced an impossible situation when 
it decided Shaw. It either had to sanction inequity by estopping 
petitioners from raising grounds they never had a chance to litigate or 
contravene the plain text of the statute, undermining the purposes for 
which IPRs were created. The Federal Circuit opted for the latter 
approach and applied a limited-scope interpretation to the estoppel 
provision.165 In doing so, not only did the Federal Circuit contravene 
the plain meaning of the America Invents Act, but it also chose an 
interpretation that will create more trouble in the long term even if it 
prevents inequity in the short term. 
A. The Federal Circuit Incorrectly Interpreted the Estoppel Provision 
Statutory interpretation begins with plain meaning.166 Plain 
meaning is determined through “reference to the language itself, . . . 
[and to] the specific context in which that language is used, and the 
broader context of the statute as a whole.”167 Here, the text, structure, 
and purpose of the America Invents Act indicate that the estoppel 
provision was intended to be interpreted broadly. Faced with a clear 
interpretation, it is not the role of the courts to rewrite what Congress 
has clearly prescribed.168 The Federal Circuit erred in its statutory 
interpretation of the estoppel provision when it interpreted estoppel in 
a more limited manner. 
1. Text.  The America Invents Act provides that petitioners who 
bring an IPR before the PTAB cannot later raise “any ground that the 
petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during that inter 
 
 163. For an explanation of why this argument applies even to claims petitioners could have 
raised in the petition but chose not to, see infra Part III.A. 
 164. See 157 CONG. REC. 2710 (2011) (“It also would include a strengthened estoppel 
standard to prevent petitioners from raising in a subsequent challenge the same patent issues that 
were raised or reasonably could have been raised in a prior challenge, [significantly reducing] the 
ability to use post-grant procedures for abusive serial challenges to patents.”). 
 165. See Shaw Indus. Grp. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(“The IPR does not begin until it is instituted. . . . Thus, Shaw did not raise—nor could it have 
reasonably raised—the Payne-based ground during the IPR.”). 
 166. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081–82 (2015). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1946 (2016) (“The 
plain text of the [statute] begins and ends our analysis.”). 
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partes review.”169 The Federal Circuit in Shaw focused on the “during” 
language in the statute and held that a petitioner cannot later raise the 
grounds on which the PTAB institutes because an IPR only begins with 
institution.170 This interpretation, however, ignores the text proceeding 
“during.” If a petitioner could not have raised redundant grounds 
“during” an IPR because the PTAB did not institute upon those 
grounds, a petitioner also could not have raised nonredundant but 
unmeritorious grounds or grounds which were never included in the 
petition at all “during” the IPR. After all, grounds raised but not 
instituted due to redundancy are outside the scope of the estoppel 
provision because those issues were not before the PTAB “during” the 
IPR. By the same logic, nonredundant grounds or grounds excluded 
from the petition should also be outside the scope of the estoppel 
provision because those issues were also not before the PTAB 
“during” the IPR. This outcome effectively renders the “or reasonably 
could have raised” language meaningless. 
2. Structure.  The provisions of the America Invents Act do not 
exist in a vacuum. Congress designed the various PTAB proceedings 
to meet different needs within the patent system.171 The estoppel 
provision attaching to IPRs must be analyzed in relation to the estoppel 
provisions attaching to the other proceedings.172 In both IPRs and post 
grant review proceedings, petitioners cannot subsequently raise “any 
ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised 
during that . . . review.”173 In a covered business method review, on the 
other hand, petitioners cannot subsequently raise “any ground that the 
petitioner raised during that . . . proceeding.”174 The differing estoppel 
parameters indicate that Congress knew how to apply a limited-scope 
estoppel provision where it wished to have one. The fact that Congress 
included the “or reasonably could have raised” language indicates that 
it intended IPRs and post grant review proceedings to encompass a 
wider range of challenges to the validity of a patent. The Federal 
Circuit’s interpretation of the estoppel provision, which essentially 
 
 169. 35 U.S.C. §315(e) (2012). 
 170. See Shaw, 817 F.3d at 1300 (“The IPR does not begin until it is instituted. . . . Thus, Shaw 
did not raise—nor could it have reasonably raised—the Payne-based ground during the IPR.”).  
 171. For an explanation of the purpose of PTAB proceedings, see supra Part I.A. 
 172. See Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1081–82 (noting that statutory provisions must be analyzed with 
reference to “the broader context of the statute as a whole”). 
 173. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e); id. § 325(e). 
 174. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)(D), 35 U.S.C. § 321 note (2012). 
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collapses the “raised or reasonably could have raised” into “raised,” is 
at odds with the structure of various proceedings established by the 
America Invents Act. 
3. Purpose.  Although the Supreme Court has indicated 
otherwise,175 legislative history indicates that Congress intended 
proceedings before the PTAB to substitute for district court 
litigation.176 The proceedings cannot serve as an effective alternative 
without a strong estoppel provision to ensure that petitioners treat the 
proceeding as their only forum to litigate novelty and nonobviousness 
grounds.177 As matters stand now, petitioners can game the system and 
use the proceedings before the PTAB as a free bite at the apple. They 
can challenge the validity of a patent cheaply and quickly before the 
PTAB and, if they lose, they preserve the nonobviousness and novelty 
challenges that were not raised or instituted. This outcome clearly 
stands at odds with the purpose for which Congress established IPRs, 
and because the Supreme Court has indicated it will not fix the issues 
inherent in the system,178 Congress must step in to protect the purpose 
underlying IPRs. 
Admittedly, IPRs can never fully substitute for district court 
litigation because petitioners can only raise novelty and 
nonobviousness grounds in such proceedings.179 One could reason that, 
in the face of such a limitation, the purpose of IPRs cannot be to 
completely replace district court litigation.180 This argument is 
 
 175. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016) (explaining that the 
purpose of IPRs is to “reexamine an earlier agency decision”). 
 176. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. 3429 (2011) (“Ideally, extending could-have-raised estoppel to 
privies will help ensure that if an inter partes review is instituted while litigation is pending, that 
review will completely substitute for at least the patents-and-printed-publications portion of the 
civil litigation.”). The Supreme Court’s decision to the contrary only further indicates that 
Congress, and not the courts, must fix the inconsistencies in the statutory framework. 
 177. See 157 CONG. REC. 2710 (2011) (“It also would include a strengthened estoppel 
standard [preventing] petitioners from raising in a subsequent challenge the same patent issues 
that were raised or reasonably could have been raised in a prior challenge. The bill would 
significantly reduce the ability to use post-grant procedures for abusive serial challenges to 
patents.”).  
 178. See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144 (noting that an IPR, instead of substituting for district 
court litigation, merely “reexamine[s] an earlier agency decision”). 
 179. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012). 
 180. Petitioners could, for example, still challenge the validity of a patent on § 101 (patent 
eligible subject matter and utility) or § 112 (written description, enablement, and definiteness) 
grounds at the district court, IPR proceeding notwithstanding. 
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bolstered by the fact that the Supreme Court in Cuozzo indicated that 
IPRs exist merely to “reexamine an earlier agency decision.”181  
But a deeper look at how IPRs function in relation to the other 
proceedings and district court litigation reveals the flaw in this line of 
reasoning. A patent, once issued, is presumed valid.182 A challenger 
may, within the first nine months of a patent’s life,183 bring a post grant 
review proceeding on any ground of invalidity.184 After nine 
months185—unless the patent is a covered business method patent186—
a challenger may only bring an IPR on novelty and nonobviousness 
grounds.187  
The limited jurisdiction within IPRs gives due effect to the 
presumption of validity. Novelty and nonobviousness grounds focus on 
the relationship between the patent at issue and other patents and 
publications known to the inventor at the time of invention.188 
Essentially, these challenges deal with the information available to the 
inventor at the time of invention. In contrast, a patent-eligible subject 
matter challenge, for example, focuses on the content of the patent 
itself and whether the invention claimed is eligible for claiming at all. 
It does not undermine the presumption of validity to review novelty 
and nonobviousness challenges, which relate to the information before 
an inventor at the time of invention. These grounds do not argue that 
something inherently wrong with the content of the patent itself makes 
the patent invalid. Instead, they argue that outside material renders the 
patent invalid because the patent claims either are obvious or not novel 
in light of other information. The limitation on which challenges one 
can raise during an IPR does not undermine the purpose of providing 
an alternative to district courts, but rather it effectuates the 
presumption of validity of issued patents.  
Furthermore, the fact that the challenges are limited does not 
mean that Congress did not intend for the proceedings to provide a 
 
 181. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2143. For more information on the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the purpose of IPRs, see supra Part II.C. 
 182. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a). 
 183. Id. § 321(c). 
 184. Id. § 321(b). 
 185. Id. § 311(c). 
 186. For more information on covered business method review, see supra Part I.B.2. 
 187. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). 
 188. In patent law, other patents and publications would be included in the category of “prior 
art.” Prior art is any information that a person having ordinary skill in the art—in other words, an 
expert in the field—would have known at the time of the invention. 
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complete substitute for district court litigation on those specific 
grounds. Even if an IPR cannot fully replace district court litigation on 
all grounds relating to the validity of a patent, it can nevertheless 
significantly reduce the number of issues that can be raised in district 
court litigation. 
B. A Limited-Scope Estoppel is a Poor Solution in the Long Term 
The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of estoppel poses many 
dangers to the system created by Congress in the long term. There is 
no real way to cabin the Federal Circuit’s line of reasoning in Shaw. 
The Federal Circuit’s focus on the “during” language within the 
estoppel provision succeeds in preventing inequity in the short term,189 
but it logically extends to cover grounds not instituted upon for reasons 
relating to the merits rather than redundancy. It can further be 
extended to cover even grounds that were not included in the petition 
at all, negating the “or reasonably could have raised” language in the 
statute.190 In Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corporation,191 for 
example, the District of Delaware noted that it had no choice but to 
allow the litigant to raise grounds not included in its IPR petition.192 
The court reasoned that, because those grounds were not raised 
“during” the IPR, its decision was controlled by the holding of Shaw.193 
It reached this conclusion despite recognizing that this outcome 
contravenes the purpose of the America Invents Act.194 In 
subsequently reviewing a request for reconsideration, the court 
 
 189. Inequity arises here when petitioners cannot later raise grounds which they never had a 
chance to fully litigate before the PTAB. 
 190. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., 221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 553–54 (D. Del. 
2016) (“Although extending the [Shaw] logic to prior art references that were never presented to 
the PTAB at all (despite their public nature) confounds the very purpose of this parallel 
administrative proceeding, the court cannot divine a reasoned way around the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation in Shaw.”), recons. denied, Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., Civ. No. 
13-453-SLR, 2017 WL 107980 (D. Del. Jan. 11, 2017). 
 191. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Toshiba Corp., 221 F. Supp. 3d 534, 553–54 (D. Del. 2016). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
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allowed for more shades of nuance on the issue195 but ultimately 
declined to reconsider its prior decision.196 
Restricting the estoppel exception to cover only grounds raised 
but not instituted can only be achieved by a feat of interpretive 
gymnastics not authorized by the text of the America Invents Act. It 
makes the PTAB the “invalidity arbiter of first resort”197 rather than 
the sole arbiter. Not only would this outcome “be inconsistent with all 
of the limitations imposed by the PTAB on IPR proceedings,”198 but it 
would result in gamesmanship and circumvent the purpose of the 
statute. Petitioners would be incentivized to include as many grounds 
as possible with minimum detail, despite PTAB guidance 
recommending including fewer and more detailed grounds.199 In this 
way, a petitioner’s goal would expressly be to have the PTAB institute 
on only some of the grounds, leaving the others available for later 
litigation in the event the petitioner lost before the PTAB. This result 
would directly undermine the purpose for which IPRs were created. 
IV.  SOLUTION 
Congress needs to step in to fix the issues within the America 
Invents Act. Although it likely could not have anticipated the way in 
which the PTAB and the courts have developed IPRs, flawed drafting 
within the America Invents Act made this outcome possible. Given the 
broad grant of rulemaking power within the America Invents Act, the 
PTO did not act outside the bounds of its authority in drafting a 
regulation enabling partial institution.200 Yet, the combination of 
 
 195. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 2017 WL 107980, at *1 (recognizing that the Federal Circuit 
had not ruled on this fact pattern and that policy arguments existed to support extending the 
estoppel to grounds not raised or cabining it only to grounds raised but not instituted). 
 196. Id. at *2 (“On the whole, since it is not my place to make policy decisions, I am not 
inclined to change my original decision, with the hopes that an appeal may clarify the issue for 
future judges in future cases.”). 
 197. Id. at *1. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See Katie J.L. Scott, Federal Circuit Adopts a Redundancy Exception to Estoppel 
Following Inter Partes Review, 28 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 13, 14 (2016) (“Notably, the 
unintended consequence of the PTO’s position and Shaw’s endorsement of that position is that 
petitioners will be incentivized to include as many grounds as will fit within the space constraints 
of a petition, contrary to the PTAB’s oft-provided guidance to include fewer, more detailed 
arguments . . . .”). 
 200. This is covered in more depth at supra Part II.C. Although the PTO could arguably 
update its regulations regarding partial institution to eliminate some of the issues highlighted in 
this Note, in light of the strict deadline the PTAB must comply with and limited resources to hire 
more personnel, the PTO is unlikely to take this step in the future. This solution also would not 
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partial institution without a corresponding way for the courts to review 
the decision to institute absent “shenanigans”201 creates a situation in 
which a properly applied estoppel provision leads to inequity. To 
interpret that estoppel provision in a more limited manner than 
intended, however, undermines the entire purpose for which IPRs 
were established because estoppel is the glue that holds the system 
together.202 IPRs cannot substitute for district court litigation unless 
they are the sole forum in which given challenges can be raised and 
litigated. The solution to the drafting flaws in the America Invents Act 
thus cannot be to limit the reach of the estoppel provision. 
A. The Federal Circuit Should Reconsider its Interpretation in Shaw 
In order to fix the system, the Federal Circuit should reconsider 
its interpretation on estoppel. Congress intended for the estoppel 
provision to broadly cover all grounds which were raised or which 
could have been raised in a petition for an IPR.203 In other words, if 
petitioners decide to avail themselves of the benefits of an IPR 
(winning and saving resources that might otherwise have been spent 
litigating before the district court), petitioners must also consign 
themselves to the risks an IPR entails (losing and being estopped from 
subsequently raising additional challenges on novelty or 
nonobviousness grounds). By ignoring the mandates of the America 
Invents Act, the Federal Circuit has essentially eliminated any risk 
petitioners face in bringing an IPR. Petitioners may now game the 
system and give themselves a quick, cheap chance to invalidate a patent 
at little to no personal cost. The only way to fix this outcome is to apply 
the estoppel provision as broadly as the text, structure, and purpose of 
the statute indicate.204 
Reinterpreting the estoppel provision may lead to inequity in the 
short term by estopping petitioners from raising claims which they 
 
fix the flaws in the statutory drafting enabling this outcome, so there would always be the threat 
that this issue would arise again in the future. In light of these obstacles, this Note will not address 
this solution in depth. 
 201. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141–42 (2016). 
 202. See 157 CONG. REC. 2710 (2011) (“It also would include a strengthened estoppel 
standard to prevent petitioners from raising in a subsequent challenge the same patent issues that 
were raised or reasonably could have been raised in a prior challenge. The bill would significantly 
reduce the ability to use post-grant procedures for abusive serial challenges to patents.”). 
 203. For an explanation of the purpose of the estoppel provision, see supra Part III. 
 204. For an explanation of why the estoppel provision should be interpreted broadly, see 
supra Part III.A. 
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never had a chance to litigate before the PTAB.205 Yet, courts should 
not contravene the plain meaning of the statute. The legislature, and 
not the courts, must fix the inequity within the statute. The inequity, 
moreover, may add extra heft to the calls for legislative reform. If 
petitioners lose the ability to later raise grounds which they never had 
the chance to litigate before the PTAB, and this is broadly perceived 
as an injustice, then Congress may have additional incentive to correct 
the system. This is especially possible given the power and influence of 
the technology sector, which boasts many repeat players in the patent 
system and stands to gain if the system improves. Congress ultimately 
will need to step in to correct the drafting of the America Invents Act, 
so any additional impetus to spur the legislature into action can only 
serve to benefit patent holders and challengers in the long term. 
B. Congress Should Intervene to Correct the System 
There are a number of actions Congress could take to ameliorate 
the effects of the combination of a broad grant of rulemaking authority, 
a lack of review on the decision to institute, and an estoppel provision 
that holds the whole system together. First, Congress could amend the 
text regarding institution to clearly prohibit partial institution. Second, 
Congress could require that in final decisions the PTAB must address 
all grounds raised in the petition, even those not instituted upon, 
allowing petitioners to preserve the right to appeal. Lastly, Congress 
could alter the substantive grant of powers to the PTO in the America 
Invents Act and either remove the PTO’s ability to issue rules or the 
unreviewability of the PTAB’s initial decision to institute. 
First, Congress could explicitly require all-or-none institution in 
the statutory provisions regarding IPRs. One of the main issues with 
the system as currently structured is that Congress has not clearly 
allowed or prohibited partial institution. If there is ambiguity in the 
text, the courts will defer to the agency’s interpretation as long as it is 
reasonable,206 and it is hard to argue that the PTO’s interpretation of 
the statute is not reasonable. The America Invents Act enables the 
PTO to consider concerns about efficiency and its ability to meet the 
statutory deadline in drafting its regulations.207 If Congress were to 
explicitly require all-or-none institution, however, a regulation 
 
 205. For an acknowledgement of the inequity of a petitioner losing the chance to litigate 
noninstituted grounds, see supra Part III. 
 206. For more information on agency deference, see supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 207. 35 U.S.C. § 316(b) (2012). 
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allowing for partial institution would clearly violate the text of the 
statute, thereby allowing courts to enforce all-or-none institution. 
Yet, all-or-none institution may not be the perfect solution. The 
PTO had valid concerns regarding the ability of the PTAB to review 
every ground raised by the petitioners in a petition and still meet its 
deadline. It would be unrealistic, for instance, to expect the PTAB to 
reach a decision on over four hundred grounds of invalidity against a 
set of patent claims within a year, especially given the volume of 
petitions it receives each year.208 Even with a good-cause extension of 
six months,209 the deadline would be nearly impossible to meet. One 
way to resolve this dilemma would be to make the PTAB distinguish 
redundant grounds210 from nonmeritorious grounds that fail to meet 
the evidentiary standard for invalidity.211  
Second, instead of requiring all-or-none institution, Congress 
could update the requirements of a final written decision. It could 
require the PTAB to address noninstituted grounds in the final written 
decision, thereby allowing petitioners to preserve the right to appeal. 
As the provision currently reads, the PTAB is required to “issue a final 
written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim 
challenged by the petitioner and any new claim added under section 
316(d).”212 Some parties have argued that this provision even now 
requires the PTAB to address every ground raised in the petition in 
this decision.213 The Federal Circuit, however, rejected this argument 
 
 208. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM2012-00003, 2012 WL 
9494791, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2012) (highlighting that the petitioner in a covered business 
method review proceeding raised 422 grounds challenging twenty patent claims); 2016 PTAB 
Statistics, supra note 14 (listing the number of petitions filed before the PTAB). 
 209. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11). 
 210. See High, supra note 34, at 612 (“To avoid the loss of a petitioner’s right to appeal on a 
redundant ground, the PTAB could institute an IPR based on all grounds that show a reasonable 
likelihood of unpatentability and then declare some of the grounds cumulative in a subsequent 
order.”). 
 211. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.1 (2017) (“The default evidentiary standard is a preponderance of the 
evidence.”). 
 212. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a). 
 213. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The 
petitioner argued, as does SAS, that the text of the final written decision statutory subsection, 35 
U.S.C. § 318(a), compels the Board to address every petition challenged claim.”), cert. granted, 
137 S. Ct. 2160 (2017); Wilson & Sieman, supra note 121 (“The set of ‘claim[s] challenged by the 
petitioner’ depends on which claims the petitioner includes in the petition, not on a later decision 
by the PTAB. The statutory language leaves little doubt the final written decision—the 
appealable one—must address the patentability of every claim challenged in the petition.”). 
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in SAS Institute, Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC.214 The court “found it 
significant that § 318(a) describes ‘claims challenged by the petitioner,’ 
whereas the institution decision statutory subsection, 35 U.S.C. § 314, 
describes ‘claims challenged in the petition.’”215 Because the variation 
in language between these two sections provided a basis for 
interpreting them differently,216 updating the language of § 318(a) to 
mirror the language of § 314 would remove the basis of treating the 
sections differently. This means the PTAB would have to address every 
ground raised in the petition in its decision. 
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in SAS Institute.217 It may soon require the PTAB to 
address every ground raised in the petition in its written decision, even 
the noninstituted ones. If the Supreme Court were to reverse the 
Federal Circuit’s decision, depending on what—if anything—the 
Supreme Court requires the PTAB to include in the written decision, 
the decision could further sow chaos into the statutory framework. A 
decision to require the PTAB to address every ground raised in the 
petition, even noninstituted grounds, could pose due process issues.218 
It would set the PTAB up to decide an issue which the parties never 
got a chance to litigate, thereby violating “the fundamental 
requirement of due process,” namely “the opportunity to be heard ‘at 
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”219 In order to avoid 
this potential due process issue, the written decision could explain the 
fact that the PTAB chose not to institute review because the ground 
did not meet the statutory requirements for institution. This 
explanation, however, would conflict with the unreviewability of the 
 
 214. See SAS Inst., Inc., 825 F.3d at 1352 (“We found, however, no statutory requirement that 
the Board’s final decision address every claim raised in a petition for inter partes review.”). The 
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on this decision. SAS Inst., Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 2160. 
 215. SAS Inst., Inc., 825 F.3d at 1352. 
 216. Id. 
 217. SAS Inst., Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 2160. 
 218. The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether IPRs are formal or informal adjudications. 
The Court’s decision in Cuozzo, because it applies Chevron deference, indicates the proceeding 
might be formal adjudication and thus subject to more stringent due process requirements. See 
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30 (2001) (denying Chevron deference for 
informal adjudication); Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (“Interpretations such 
as those in opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, 
and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style 
deference.”). 
 219. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). 
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decision not to institute an IPR.220 The appellate court reviewing the 
decision not to institute would need the authority to address the merits 
of the ground raised below rather than merely the authority to review 
the PTAB’s decision not to institute an IPR on that ground.221 This 
outcome would preserve the unreviewability of the initial decision to 
institute while still avoiding the inequity associated with a lack of any 
judicial review. 
Third, Congress could also target the substantive powers at play 
in undermining the system, namely its grant of broad rulemaking 
authority to the PTO or the unreviewability of the decision to institute. 
These powers, however, were given for a reason and to remove them 
would pose a new set of dangers for the system. Without rulemaking 
authority, for example, it would be difficult for the PTO to regulate the 
proceedings before the PTAB. Congress would need to provide more 
guidance on the standards of review and conduct of the proceedings, 
which would require more time and waste more resources. The system 
can run much more efficiently with most of the regulation coming from 
a single agency. The fact that the powers could be used to the detriment 
of the system in one way does not mean that the powers should not 
exist at all. In a similar vein, allowing the courts to review every 
decision to institute or not institute an IPR would create vast 
inefficiency within the system. The proceedings are designed to be 
completed within a year.222 This deadline would be impossible to meet 
if petitioners were able to litigate the decision to institute before the 
courts. The main benefits of PTAB proceedings—the savings in time 
and resources—would be immediately lost. 
It is worth highlighting that if the Federal Circuit were to 
reconsider its estoppel interpretation such that it conforms to the 
statute but works harsher results, petitioners might be reluctant to 
bring IPR procedures until Congress is able to update the statute. Yet, 
petitioners had no way to know how broad estoppel was for IPRs until 
the Federal Circuit ruled in Shaw, and nonetheless brought many IPRs 
before the Shaw decision.223 Given the history of IPR use before Shaw, 
 
 220. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012) (making the decision to institute or not institute an IPR 
unreviewable). 
 221. This solution may pose the additional issue of whether to allow for supplementation of 
the record on review for challenges to the decision not to institute review. 
 222. 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11). 
 223. Shaw was decided on March 23, 2016. Shaw Indus. Grp. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 
817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Between September 16, 2012 and March 31, 2016, petitioners made 
a total of 4743 petitions to the PTAB. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND 
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it seems unlikely that a reconsideration of the estoppel provision would 
significantly deter petitioners from seeking out IPRs. 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit in Shaw significantly undermined the ability 
of PTAB proceedings to substitute for district court litigation on 
novelty and nonobviousness grounds. Instead of ensuring that 
petitioners are held to the decisions of a single forum with respect to 
any grounds which the petitioners raised or could have raised during 
an IPR, the Federal Circuit opened the door for gamesmanship and 
abuse of the system. Petitioners may now use IPRs as a free chance to 
invalidate a patent while preserving redundant grounds that effectively 
argue the same point for subsequent district court litigation.  
While it would be easy to place all of the blame on the Federal 
Circuit for this turn of events, Shaw itself does not shoulder all of the 
responsibility. Shaw merely highlights a larger underlying problem 
within the drafting of the America Invents Act itself. Congress created 
a perfect storm with the broad grant of rulemaking power to the PTO, 
unreviewable PTAB decisions to institute, and the estoppel provision. 
This combination led to a scenario in which the correct interpretation 
of the estoppel provision would inevitably lead to inequity. It is not, 
however, the role of the Federal Circuit to correct mistakes in a 
statutory scheme devised by Congress. A limited-scope interpretation 
of estoppel only further sows chaos and disorder within the system. 
Congress must step in to correct the inadequacies. It should require 
either that the PTAB institute on all or none of the grounds raised in a 
petition or that the final written decision address every ground raised 
by the petitioner and provide for appellate review on the merits of each 
ground. 
 
 
APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS (Mar. 31, 2016), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016-3-31%20PTAB.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ELM6-WFR8]. Of those 4743 petitions, 4288 were petitions for an IPR. Id. As 
of December 31, 2016, petitioners made a cumulative total of 6143 petitions to the PTAB, 5591 
of which were for an IPR. 2016 PTAB Statistics, supra note 14. 
